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This article studies the within-country regional effects of trade liberalisation in Central
and Eastern European countries. CEE countries liberalised their trade with the
European Union from the mid-1990s, while also receiving substantial foreign
investment in the process. The first part of the period witnessed strong agglomeration
effects in all of the countries, leading progressively to core–periphery type
specialisation, and increasing regional wage differentials. In the second part of the
period, however, there is notable evidence of a reversal in the relative regional
specialisation, pointing to a U-shaped pattern of relative regional wages. Using the
regional data for five CEE countries in 1990–2004 we argue that FDI inflows can be an
important factor accelerating the observed regional adjustment process in the host
country. First, we show that in four out of five CEE countries there is a significant
U-shaped adjustment pattern of regional wages after they opened up to foreign trade.
Second, we find robust econometric confirmation that in three of the five countries FDI
has contributed significantly to faster adjustment of relative regional wages.
The opening-up of former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) and
their trade integration with the European Union (EU) resulted in an extensive restructuring
of production. While the vast majority of studies on economic restructuring in CEECs so
far have dealt with inter-sectoral restructuring of production, this article focuses on inter-
regional relocation of production within individual countries. The transition from a closed
economy to complete trade liberalisation with the EU brings us as close to a large-scale
natural experiment for assessing the relevance of the new economic geography (NEG)
models as we are likely to get. Despite scepticism about the simplifying assumptions and
‘overly’ specific functional forms expressed by Neary (2001) in an excellent overview of
the field, NEG models enable us to analyse the effects of trade liberalisation on
international as well as intra-national relocation of manufacturing activity. The exact
pattern of relocation of manufacturing activity, however, is ambiguous and dependent on
the underlying assumptions. Crucially, assumptions about inter-regional factor mobility as
well as the approach to the formalisation of agglomeration/dispersion forces determine the
model’s predictions and implications. These can be surprisingly diverse, ranging from
increasing (or complete) agglomeration as in Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and Puga and
Venables (1997) to a more even spread of economic activity (Krugman and Venables
1995, Puga 1999).
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So far only a few authors (Bru¨lhart et al. 2004, Crozet and Koenig 2004, Egger et al.
2005, Bru¨lhart and Koenig 2006) have studied the effects of trade liberalisation on the
inter-regional relocation of production in CEECs. It is interesting, however, that while
most of the empirical studies demonstrated that inter-sectoral restructuring in CEECs has
been associated with massive inflows of foreign direct investment (Damijan and Rojec
2007), the impact of FDI on inter-regional relocation of production and wage disparities
has been widely neglected. The novelty of our approach compared with the above-
mentioned studies on CEECs is that it focuses on explaining the dynamics of regional
adjustment in response to trade liberalisation. Also, using longer time series on CEE
countries allows us to study the relocation process in greater detail as the adjustment may
take longer to unravel. Finally, our contribution also lies in the introduction of
international capital flows as a (possibly crucial) factor in regional development in
transition economies.
The primary contribution of the article hence lies in the empirical analysis of the
effects of trade liberalisation with the EU on inter-regional relocation of manufacturing
and inter-regional adjustment of relative wages in CEE countries. We focus on the exact
adjustment pattern of relative regional wages, examining how NEG models, extended to
take account of international and interregional capital mobility, can explain the actual
regional adjustment pattern in selected CEE countries. Specifically, we study whether the
response of relative regional wages to a reduction of foreign trade costs is monotonic and
leads to strong regional polarisation as first suggested by Krugman (1991b) or is non-
monotonic and associated with less pronounced regional polarisation as suggested by
more recent NEG approaches. In addition, in the case of a non-monotonic response we
test whether the regional pattern of FDI inflows can explain the regional adjustment
pattern of wages. Implications of NEG models are tested using a unique regional data
panel for five CEE countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia) in
1990–2004.
Our results suggest that the expected U-shaped adjustment pattern of relative wages is
confirmed by the data in four of the five countries analysed. In addition, after careful
examination and using the appropriate panel data techniques as well as controlling for the
potential endogeneity between wages and FDI, we find that in three of the five countries
FDI is shown to have the theoretically suggested effect. FDI contributes to faster
adjustment of relative regional wages in regions more heavily affected by trade
liberalisation. Based on these findings one can argue that, owing to the inherent imperfect
inter-regional mobility of labour, foreign direct investment can be an important factor
helping to mitigate the potentially negative effects of trade liberalisation in peripheral
regions.
The structure of the article is as follows. First we review previous empirical studies.
Next we describe the empirical model and then we discuss the datasets used and
descriptive statistics of the crucial variables in our empirical model. The following section
discusses econometric methodology issues and presents estimation results both for the
static and for the dynamic specification of the model. The final section summarises the
basic findings of the study and provides some policy implications.
Previous empirical studies
Pioneering efforts in empirical research on the new economic geography’s implications
were made by Hanson (1996, 1997) with the analysis of the effects of Mexican trade
liberalisation on the country’s internal economic geography. From a closed economy
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setting, where manufacturing was concentrated near the capital city, trade liberalisation
caused manufacturing to relocate towards the Mexico–US border. This, as Hanson shows,
leads to a convergence in relative regional wages and an increase in border-region
employment. In another of the earlier empirical papers on the NEG implications of trade
liberalisation, Bru¨lhart and Torstensson (1996) propose a non-monotonic relationship
between regional integration and geographical concentration of increasing-returns
industries in EU countries. They find mixed evidence, however, and prove this hypothesis
only indirectly by finding some support for it solely in intra-industry trade flows among
EU countries. Forslid et al. (2002) use a large-scale CGE model to simulate the effects of
economic integration on the location of industrial production. They discover a non-
monotonic relationship between trade liberalisation and concentration of production
(inverted U-shape) for industries driven by economies of scale, while a monotonic
relationship is observed for comparative advantage-driven industries. Brakman et al.
(2004) estimate the Helpman–Hanson empirical model (compare Helpman 1998, Hanson
2005) using data for Germany. An advantage of the Helpman–Hanson model is that it
incorporates the fact that agglomeration of economic activity increases the prices of local
(non-tradable) services. Using specific data for 151 districts for 1994 the authors
succeeded in supporting the idea of a spatial nominal wage structure in Germany.
Similarly, Mion (2004) extends the Helpman model to include multiple locations and tests
its implications on data for Italian provinces. Following a variant of Hanson’s empirical
strategy, he shows that final demand linkages influence the distribution of earnings and, in
contrast to Hanson’s findings, that the scope for such spatial externalities need not be
limited.
Recently, research on the implications of NEG models for patterns of economic
activity in CEE countries too has been undertaken. Important work on studying the
regional relocation processes in CEE countries has been done by a number of researchers
who present their findings in a monograph edited by Traistaru et al. (2003). They find
that increasing economic integration of CEE countries with the EU during the 1990s
resulted in significant inter-regional relocation of manufacturing activity in selected
countries. The winners in this process are either capital regions or western and northern
regions that are bordering (or closer to) the large EU markets. In a related study by
Crozet and Koenig (2004) data on Romanian regions for 1991–97 are used and the
authors find that, in line with theoretical predictions, trade liberalisation favours the
economic development of border regions when the positive effects are not outweighed by
competitive pressure from the international markets.1 Bru¨lhart and Koenig (2006)
analyse the internal spatial wage and employment structures in five Central European
transition economies between 1996 and 2000. They show that although wages and
location of economic activity comply with NEG predictions, wages are discretely higher
in capital regions where service employment is strongly concentrated. The observed
concentration of economic activity in capital regions (termed ‘the Comecon hypothesis’)
is significantly stronger than in EU member states. On the other hand, Egger et al. (2005)
study s-divergence of regional wages in eight CEECs. Using data on broad, NUTS-2
regions for the period 1991–98 they find significant convergence of real wages only in
Poland and Bulgaria. However, they establish that countries with faster growing export
openness experienced larger increases in their regional disparities, lending support to the
notion that trade liberalisation leads to an initial divergence in regional economic
concentration and regional wages.2
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The empirical model
The majority of the standard NEG models do not deliver very clear predictions. Most of
the models (such as Krugman (1991b) and Krugman and Venables (1995)) are suited to the
case of two countries only (large vs. small country analysis). At the same time, the
predictions of these models are not uniform and are subject to multiple equilibria
depending on parameter values. In addition, these predictions change substantially with
modifications in model assumptions and spatial framework.3 The implications of two-
country models therefore, depending on the assumptions used (factor mobility,
intermediate goods etc.), range from complete agglomeration to perfect dispersion of
economic activity. While Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) in a two-country three-
region framework predict that a decrease in international transport cost between the
countries may foster a monotonic dispersion of economic activity in the smaller country,
Alonso-Villar (2001) in a three-country framework, Monfort and Nicolini (2000) in a two-
country four-region framework and Paluzie (2001) in a two-country three-region
framework argue that trade liberalisation is more likely to foster agglomeration of
economic activity in a country opening to trade. Finally, Crozet and Koenig (2004) show
in a two-country three-region framework that trade liberalisation is likely to favour the
development of border regions.
Compared with the above NEG models and based on a version of an asymmetric-
location NEGmodel with mobile capital (Damijan and Kostevc 2008), we generate a set of
clear and unique predictions for the effects of trade liberalisation on reallocation of
economic activity. These predictions are based on the outcomes of a model with three
asymmetrically placed regions (with the smaller home-country region enjoying a
proximity advantage to the larger foreign country), imperfectly mobile labour and
internationally mobile capital. A foreign investor considering the smaller country is faced
with the choice of two locations, where advantages of agglomeration, infrastructure,
relative wages and investor incentives will be among the many factors impacting the
ultimate location decision (Jones and Wren 2006, Braunerhjelm and Thulin 2009).
Crucially, all of the countries considered in this study employ or have employed
investment incentives that specifically target less developed regions (Rojec et al. 2010).
While lower relative wages, proximity to the EU markets and location-specific investment
incentives certainly benefit border regions compared with economic centres in terms of
attracting investment, agglomeration effects improve the attractiveness of the central
location. Ultimately, the spatial pattern of international capital flows is determined by the
relative strength of these opposing forces.
The effects of trade liberalisation in such a setting are potentially dual. Mobile
factors of production will tend to foster agglomeration, which, in turn, is also self-
reinforcing. The asymmetric positioning of the two home-country regions vis-a`-vis the
larger foreign country counteracts these agglomeration tendencies to a certain extent as
proximity to the foreign market affords the smaller domestic regions greater benefits
from trade liberalisation. In non-border regions this adjustment pattern, although present,
might be less pronounced owing to diminished initial market access. The direction and
speed of the adjustment of economic activity across the regions will hence depend on the
relative strength of these opposing forces. Given that low intra-country labour mobility is
well documented for CEE countries,4 we can assume that the adjustment pattern of
relative regional wages is likely to be non-linear along the lines of Krugman and
Venables (1995, 1996) and Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996) as opposed to models
with a highly mobile labour force (Krugman 1991a, 1991b). Foreign investment, as
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noted above, could serve as either a dispersion or an agglomeration force depending on
its destination within the host country. Furthermore, the effect could well depend on the
progress of the liberalisation process as well, where the relationship between a reduction
in trade costs and shifts in the concentration of economic activity tends not to be linear.
A common feature of NEG models with low factor mobility and symmetrically
positioned regions is that initial agglomeration forces tend to prevail, promoting further
divergence but only at a lower level of trade costs.
In order to estimate the impact of FDI on the spatial reallocation of economic activity
after and during trade liberalisation, we propose the following testable empirical model
based on the above discussion and theoretical considerations. We measure relative
economic activity with relative regional wages (w2/w1) because this is clearly the
measure of choice in most NEG models and also because it indicates the ultimate
outcome of relative regional performance. Given that we are interested in measuring the
convergence/divergence relative to the relevant economic frontier, we measure wages of
all regions relative to that of the country’s most developed region (i.e. economic centre).
In order to try and control for the relative scope for external economies of scale in both
regions (i.e. agglomeration effects), we introduce relative size of the regions (again,
relative to the economic centre) in terms of the number of firms. The relative importance
of regional foreign direct investment is, similarly, measured by the number of foreign-
owned firms in a region, relative to the central region. Finally, further control variables
are employed to net out temporal effects, region-specific effects and other indicator
variables.
Based on this we can specify our empirical model as:
rW ¼ f ðrn; time; FTA; BORDÞ ð1Þ
where rW ( ¼ w2/w1) denotes relative regional wages and rn ( ¼ n2/n1) is relative
number of firms in region 2 relative to the capital region. We decompose relative number
of firms further into domestic-owned rn D( ¼ n2D/n1D) and foreign-owned firms rn F( ¼
F( ¼ n2F/n1F). Hence, by construction, rn F indicates relative importance of FDI in region
r relative to the capital region. Given that the vast majority of firms in a given region are
domestically owned, the relative regional size is proxied by the relative number of
domestically owned firms. The relative regional size also reflects the wider array of
agglomeration forces which impact broader spatial distribution of economic activity.
As capital mobility is assumed to be greater than mobility of labour, we believe that,
rather than region-specific, interest rates are firm-specific. As is the case with other
unobserved firm characteristics, we employ the fixed-effects estimator to account for
these variables. For transport/trade cost, we would ideally have time series data on
transport cost between regions and with foreign countries as well as time series data on
tariffs and other trade barriers for each individual region in the selected countries.
However, as no such time-variant indicator of transport/trade cost at the regional level in
selected CEE countries is available, we try to account for the dynamics of transport/trade
cost by including three different variables. We include time, which is a time trend, to
account for time-related decreasing dynamics of overall transport cost.5In addition, we
include FTA, a dummy variable for enforcement of a free trade agreement between an
individual country and the European Union (EU). FTA accounts for speeding up of trade
liberalisation after the enforcement of FTAs. Finally, BORD captures border region
specific dynamics of trade liberalisation.
Based on the above implications of our model, we examine the spatial repercussions of
trade liberalisation in CEE countries and explain the factors driving the adjustment pattern
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of regional wages by estimating the following empirical model:
rWit ¼ aþ nt þ vt 2 þ rnit þ wrFDIit þ gBORDi þ lFTAþ 1it ð2Þ
where:
rWit relative regional wage (i.e. wage ratio of region i to the capital region)
t, t 2 time effects (i.e. linear and squared time trend)
rn relative size of a region calculated as the relative number of domestically owned
firms in region i relative to the capital region
rFDIit relative regional FDI calculated as the ratio of the number of foreign-owned
firms to the total number of firms in region i relative to the capital region
BORDi dummy for western/northern border regions
FTA dummy for enforcement of trade liberalisation with the EU
1it iid. error term.
Note that in all of the subsequent analyses and empirical estimations we use relative
regional indicators in order to capture inter-regional relocation patterns in a particular
transition country. Relative regional indicators for wages and FDI are thus calculated as
the ratio of the r-th region’s performance to the capital (c) region’s performance.
Based on the above discussion and the expected fit of NEGmodels to the actual data on
CEE economies, we expect the following pattern of coefficients in our empirical model.
Initially, trade liberalisation as proposed inmodelswith limited or no labourmobility should
cause a divergence of relative regional wages but, depending on the length of the period of
observation and the strength of dispersion forces, this divergencemight be overcome after a
certain time period. We therefore expect either a significantly negative or non-significant
coefficient of the FTA variable, depending on the length of the datasets. Second, regional
data for CEE countries should exhibit a U-shaped curve of relative regional wages. We
therefore expect a significant negative sign of the trend variable t and a significant positive
sign of the squared trend variable t 2. Third, the regional pattern of FDI inflows should have a
significant impact on the above adjustment pattern of relative regional wages.Depending on
whether investors choose to target the existing economic centres or focus on the developing
periphery the sign of the coefficient on the rFDIit variable will be either negative or
positive.6 Fourth, after the initial divergence W/N border regions should exhibit faster
convergence and higher levels of relative wages compared with non-border regions, given
their preferential location and the potential for investment inflows. We therefore expect a
significant positive coefficient on the border variable BORDi.
The methodological issues related to estimation of Equation (2) as well as the
estimation approaches used are discussed in the section presenting the results. Before
presenting and discussing the results we discuss the data and descriptive statistics of the
crucial variables in the empirical model.
Data and descriptive statistics
Data
We analyse the above propositions using regional data for five CEE countries that became
EU members in 2004 and 2007. These countries are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania
and Slovenia. The choice of countries is not completely arbitrary; it is simply subject to the
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availability and quality of the data. The countries examined in our study are very
heterogeneous both in terms of their level of development and advancement of the
transition process and in terms of their distance to the core of the EU. One may thus expect
that the border effects in more distant countries like Bulgaria and Romania, which are also
less advanced, will be less pronounced than in the EU-bordering CEE countries like
Hungary and Slovenia7.
The data used in this study were collected during two research projects on the regional
pattern of production relocation in CEE countries.8The data for all countries were
collected at both NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 levels which, compared with other regional studies
on CEE countries, allows a more precise analysis of the spatial repercussions of trade
liberalisation in these countries.9
Table 1 gives more information on our datasets, such as the number of regions and
time of enforcement of trade liberalisation with the EU (FTA). We make use of long
panels of regional data at the NUTS-3 level with data starting in the early 1990s and
ending as recently as possible. Owing to different data availability the periods covered by
the datasets for individual countries do not overlap completely. For Bulgaria and Hungary
our datasets cover 1990–99, for Romania our dataset covers 1992–99, while for Estonia
and Slovenia our datasets cover 1992–2004 and 1994–2003 respectively. The number of
NUTS-3 regions, which serve as our units of observation, ranges between 12 (Slovenia)
and 41 (Romania). Wage data are recalculated into 1994 constant prices using PPI indices.
We use data for the manufacturing sector only, as other sectors are far less subject to trade
liberalisation.
In the empirical estimations, regional data at the more disaggregated NUTS-3 level are
taken for individual observations. While wage data and data on FDI do not require further
explanation, some clarifications should be made with regard to the trade liberalisation
variable FTA. Unfortunately, with the exception of Slovenia, we lack data on the evolution
of actual foreign trade barriers over the period under examination at both the country and
the regional level. Ideally, one should take the time pattern of actual foreign trade barriers
(tariffs, NTBs) at the regional level and estimate the impact of their reduction on spatial
repercussions in each country, but as no such data are available, we must rely on data on
the date when the free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU came into force. This, however,
poses several problems. First, in some of the countries a FTA came into force at the
beginning of the period under examination, which of course eliminates the reference
period needed for comparison of the economic geography effects before and after trade
liberalisation. Second, some of the countries examined (Slovenia) unilaterally liberalised
their trade even before the FTA came into force. Third, FTAs with the EU were designed
asymmetrically in favour of CEE countries. Hence, the date the FTA came into force does
not imply that trade barriers were reduced linearly from that point on. In all of the
countries, trade barriers for the most sensitive goods were eliminated at the end of the
Table 1. Coverage of regional data by countries.
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Romania Slovenia
Data coverage 1990–99 1992–99 1990–99 1992–99 1994–00
FTA in force 1994 1994 1992 1993 1997
Number of NUTS-2 regionsa 6 5 7 8 12
Number of NUTS-3 regionsb 28 15 20 41 166
Notes: a NUTS-3 regions in Slovenia. b NUTS-5 regions in Slovenia.
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period examined. However, there is little one can do about this problem. What remains is
to be cautious when discussing the results. On the other hand, we have separately
estimated the model with Slovenian data using either the FTA dummy variable or the data
on actual tariffs applied by regions. The two estimations, however, do not differ
significantly in terms of the signs and significance of the parameters for trade
liberalisation.
Evolution of relative regional wages
In this section we examine the evolution of relative regional wages by individual
countries. The graphic analysis depicted in Figure 1 combined with some descriptive
statistics in Table A1 (in the Appendix) give us a clear insight into the pattern of relative
wages after countries liberalised trade with the EU. Figure 1 reveals that all the countries,
with the exception of Bulgaria, already experienced significant dispersion of regional
wages before trade liberalisation started. In the early 1990s the standard deviation of
regional wages in all the countries was between 0.08 and 0.10 (i.e. between 9% and 15%
when measured with the coefficient of variation) with the exception of Bulgaria where it
was below 5%. On the other hand, in the early 1990s the average relative regional wage
(measured by the mean or median) compared with the central region was quite high in
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia (92, 95 and 87% respectively), but lower in Hungary
(82%) and Estonia, where it was only about 67% of that in the central region.
In line with the predictions of our model, most of the countries’ relative regional wages
declined in the course of trade liberalisation. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania the
decline in the average relative regional wages until 1999 was very large–by 14–15%
relative to the central region. Only in Estonia and Slovenia did relative regional wages
increase over the period–by 1% in Slovenia and 5% in Estonia. One has to bear in mind,
however, that for Slovenia and Estonia we can track changes in regional wages until 2003
and 2004 respectively, while for the other three countries we can only observe the
pattern of regional wages until 1999. This may be very important since–as revealed by
Figures 2 and 3a–the evolution of relative regional wages in all of the countries examined
seems to follow a U-shaped adjustment pattern. One can therefore expect that relative
wages in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania would have recovered after 1999, when our
datasets end. Indeed, in Bulgaria and Romania, the lowest point in divergence of regional
wages was reached in 1996, in Hungary in 1998 and in Estonia and Slovenia in 1999. In all
of the countries relative regional wages subsequently recovered and started converging to
the wage level in the central region. Furthermore, Figures 2a and 2b demonstrate that
along with the process of recovering of the average relative regional wages one can also
observe a clear trend of s-convergence shown in the fact that the standard deviation of
regional wages decreased in all of the countries after regional wages reached the lowest
point. In other words, one can simultaneously observe a U-shaped adjustment pattern of
relative regional wages and an inverted U-shaped trend of variation of regional wages.
This can be taken as an indication of s-divergence of regional wages in the first stage of
trade liberalisation and of s-convergence of regional wages towards the end of the period
under examination. We believe that with longer time panels of regional data these trends
would become even more pronounced.
The second important issue that requires closer examination are the differences in
adjustment pattern of relative wages between W/N border and non-border regions. Our
model predicts that after the initial downturn W/N border regions will attract new firms
and start catching up with the central region at a faster pace than non-border regions.
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Figure 1. Pattern of relative regional wages in transition countries, 1990–2004.
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A number of studies for individual CEE countries (Traistaru et al. 2003) confirm these
predictions by showing a clear trend of manufacturing activity shifting towards either the
capital or the W/N border regions during the 1990s. As a consequence, relative regional
wages adjusted accordingly. Figure 3 shows that after countries opened up to trade,
relative wages in W/N border regions decreased at a lower rate and started recovering
earlier and at a faster pace than in non-border regions. These trends are particularly
pronounced in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. With the exception of Romania,
in all the countries the wage differential between the W/N border and non-border regions
increased over the period. It remains to be shown how much of this faster adjustment
pattern in W/N border regions can be attributed to increased economic activity brought
about by FDI.
Evolution of relative regional FDI
As shown in Table 2, the selected CEE countries received substantial FDI inflows during
the 1990s. The share of all CEE countries in world FDI flows increased from 0.2% in 1990
to 2.3% in 2000 (World Investment Report 2001). In the countries under examination the
stock of FDI throughout the 1990s accumulated to some 15–50% of GDP. The major
recipient of FDI in absolute terms among the selected countries was Hungary, while in
relative terms (as a share of GDP) FDI played the most important role in Estonia.
Figure 4 depicts the pattern of relative regional presence of foreign-invested
enterprises (FIEs)10 in W/N border and non-border regions in individual countries.11 Here,
in the absence of more appropriate data, the number of FIEs relative to the number of
domestic firms serves as an effective measure of the regional importance of FDI. As
discussed earlier, these indicators should be interpreted with considerable caution. As we
use only data on the number of firms and not on their output, this may introduce some bias
into our findings.
Figure 4 shows that, with the noted exception of Slovenia, FDI inflows in CEE
countries are very polarised since the vast majority of FDI inflows into manufacturing
industries is directed into the capital region. On average, the share of FDI in other regions
is well below 10% and in Romania even below 5% of the level achieved by the central
region. This evidence is in line with the findings of Alessandrini and Contessi (2001) who
found that the majority of FDI inflows in CEE countries have been directed into the central
regions and traditional economic centres.12 Nevertheless, the regional pattern of
manufacturing FDI does, by and large, correspond to the one suggested by our model. First
of all, in all five countries the relative regional shares of FDI in W/N border regions are
substantially (up to three times) higher than in non-border regions. Second, this
differential increased further with the process of trade liberalisation as W/N border regions
succeeded in attracting relatively more FDI than non-border regions. To sum up, as W/N
border regions continue to receive larger FDI inflows than other peripheral regions they
should therefore exhibit relatively faster economic growth and faster catch-up of relative
wages compared with the central region.
Results
Econometric approach
Before we turn to the estimation results of our empirical model (2), a few words need to be
said about the methodology of estimations. There are two important issues to be discussed
with respect to the specification of model (2). The first is the importance of idiosyncratic
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regional effects in the panel data framework due to the specific structure of the error term,
and the second is the problem of potential endogeneity between relative regional wages
and FDI.
First, in the above empirical model strong individual regional effects can be expected.
Therefore, one must make specific assumptions regarding the error structure. We assume
the error term uit has the following properties:
uit ¼ h i þ eitði ¼ 1; . . . ; n; t ¼ 1; . . . ; TÞ
E½hi=xit – 0 and E½eit=xit;hi ¼ 0
eit ~Nð0;s2Þ ð3Þ
According to Equation (3), we assume that some unobserved individual regional
effects are present (hi), which are time-invariant and correlated with the right-hand side
regressors in Equation (2). The remaining disturbances (eit) are assumed to be normally
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Figure 4. Mean relative regional FDI in W/N border and non-border regions by countries,
1990–2004.
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distributed with zero mean and constant variance. Note that for the sake of convenience
henceforth we will refer to specification (2) as the static specification of the model. Our
data are structured as regional panel data for a time span of 7–13 years (depending on the
country in question), which requires an explicit account of the region-specific effects.
With the above structure of the model the use of an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
is not justified anymore and one should adopt one of the usual estimators dealing with
individual effects. In general, when using a static specification of the empirical model in a
panel data framework there are two well-known ways of controlling for this bias. The first
option is to employ the fixed effects (FE) estimator, which assumes fixed (constant)
region-specific effects over time, which are correlated with the right-hand side regressors.
On the other hand, the random effects (RE) estimator assumes that region-specific effects
are random and only reflected in the error term, i.e. uncorrelated over time. We are
interested in observing the pattern of changes in relative regional performance over time
induced by external shocks such as trade liberalisation. Given that different regions are
likely to respond idiosyncratically to trade liberalisation, the FE estimator seems the
natural choice. Therefore, in Equation (3) we specify our assumptions about the structure
of the error term, which enables us to take explicit control of these effects. An important
drawback of the FE estimator in the present case, however, is that some of the crucial
variables in our empirical model are time-invariant (such as border dummies and the trade
liberalisation dummy). When performing regular FE estimations these variables are
differenced out and therefore dropped from the estimation procedure. In order to avoid
this, we decided to employ the RE estimator as it allows us to obtain estimates of the time-
invariant BORD and FTA variables as well.
Another important issue is that even though FDI may be modelled as an exogenous
occurrence the actual regional pattern of FDI inflows is not independent of regional
characteristics. On the contrary, the regional pattern of FDI is determined endogenously as
it is attracted to domestic regions according to either agglomeration forces or lower
relative regional wages. An important consequence of this is the endogeneity between
relative regional wages (rWit) and relative regional FDI (rFDIit) in the specification of our
model. This means that model (2) captures dynamic processes in the regions as the current
inflow of FDI is determined endogenously by previous relative regional wages, and
present FDI determines future relative regional wages. More specifically, the endogeneity
between rWit and rFDIit implies that the error term uit is correlated with rFDIit. This can be
seen clearly if the error term uit is rewritten accordingly:
uit ¼ hi þ ðnit þ mitÞ ði ¼ 1; . . . ; n; t ¼ 1; . . . ; TÞ ð4Þ
with the assumptions
nit ¼ rnit21 þ eit
eit;mit , MAð0Þ
where the remaining error term eit is decomposed into nit which is an autoregressive
regional shock, while mit represents serially uncorrelated measurement error. Note that all
RHS regressors in model (2) are potentially correlated with region-specific effects hi as
well as with both autoregressive shocks nit and measurement errors mit.
The time dimension of panel data enables us to capture these dynamics of adjustment
directly by including the lagged dependent as well as lagged independent variables.
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Hence, a dynamic version of the relative regional wage model (2) can then be written as
rWit ¼ rrWit21 þ nt þ vt 2 þ wrFDIit þ rwrFDIit21 þ gBORDi þ lFTA
þ hið12 rÞ þ eit þ ðmit 2 rmit21Þ
ð5Þ
In the above dynamic specification of the model we have perfect simultaneity as not
only are present and lagged dependent variables correlated but also lagged dependent
variables (wages) are assumed to be correlated with present independent variables (FDI)
and vice versa. Applying the OLS estimator to model specification (5) would inevitably
lead to inconsistent and biased coefficients. The OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent
when all explanatory variables are exogenous and are uncorrelated with the individual
specific effects. This, however, is not the case in our model, which includes lagged
variables. One can show that the OLS estimator will be seriously biased owing to
correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the individual specific effects as well as
with the independent variables. This is due to the fact that rWit is a function of hi in
Equation (5), and then rWit21 is also a function of hi. As a consequence, rWit21 is
correlated with the error term, which renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent,
even if the nit and mit in Equation (4) are not serially correlated. This holds also whether
the individual effects are considered fixed or random (see Hsiao 1986, Baltagi 1995,
Wooldridge 2002).
Therefore, in estimating (5) one should use one of the usual instrumental variable
methods that are applied in the dynamic panel data framework. A natural choice of
approach that allows us to control for the unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity in
Equation (5) is application of GMM (general method of moments) estimators (Arellano
and Bond 1991). There are two possible choices of application of the GMM approach to
dynamic panel data. The difference GMM (diff-GMM) method uses lagged levels as
instruments for first-differenced equations. However, as shown by Arellano and Bover
(1995), lagged level instruments used in the diff-GMM approach are weak instruments for
first-differenced equations. Arellano and Bond (1998) and Blundell and Bond (1998,
1999) suggest that application of system GMM (sys-GMM) estimators is a more
appropriate approach to dynamic panel data than using diff-GMM estimators. If the model
is estimated in levels, the corresponding instruments for xit23 are xit21, xit22 and Dxit21
(where x stands generally for all included variables) and so on for longer time periods. This
approach allows for a larger set of lagged levels and first-differences instruments and
therefore enables us to exploit fully all of the available moment conditions. Hence, the
system GMM approach maximises both the consistency and the efficiency of the estimator
applied. The only drawback of the sys-GMM approach to dynamic panel data is that either
balanced panel data or longer time series are required since the first two years of
observations are used up as instruments.
Results of the static model specification
In this section we provide basic estimation results of our empirical model (2) using OLS
and RE estimators.13Table 3 provides OLS estimations which serve as a benchmark for
comparison with RE estimations as well as the GMM estimations following in the next
subsection. Overall, the OLS results are in line with our expectations and can be
summarised as follows. First, in all the countries, with the exception of Romania, the
estimations return negative and significant coefficients for the trend variable t and positive
and significant coefficients on the squared trend variable t 2.14 This result conforms to our
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predictions of a U-shaped response of relative regional wages to trade liberalisation.
Second, in all the countries, with the exception of Hungary, the estimated coefficient of
relative regional FDI (rFDIit) is significantly positive. Hence FDI is shown to contribute
positively to the actual pattern of adjustment of regional wages. For Hungary, the finding
of insignificant impact of FDI on regional wages comes as a surprise, since Hungary
attracted large inflows of foreign capital during the 1990s. The obvious explanation for
this finding is that the vast majority of FDI in Hungary has been directed to the central
region, and has in turn not contributed to regional convergence of wages. Third, the
coefficient BORD is significantly positive in all the countries, with the exception of
Romania, indicating that border regions do have higher wages due to higher economic
concentration. The wage differential between W/N border regions and the other regions
ranges between 1.6 and 8.1% depending on the country in question, while the average
wage premium of W/N border regions over all of the countries amounts to 3.1%.
The RE estimations (Table 4) which control for common regional effects almost
entirely replicate the OLS estimations. A U-shaped response of relative regional wages to
trade liberalisation is confirmed for all the countries except Romania. The average wage
differential between W/N border and non-border regions over all of the countries is
estimated at 3.3% (compared with 3.1% in the case of OLS estimates). These estimates are
similar to those obtained by Bru¨lhart and Koenig (2006), who estimate average wage
gradients of border regions in five CEE countries at 2.7%.15 The only significant
difference from the OLS estimations is that the RE estimations do not return a significant
effect of relative regional FDI (rFDIit) for Romania, while with OLS the coefficient for
rFDIit was significantly positive and very large.
Results of the dynamic model specification
In this section we provide robustness checks for the OLS and RE estimations by estimating
the dynamic specification of model (5). We apply the sys-GMM econometric method
allowing instruments (levels and first differences) to take up to four lags. In Table 5 we
report estimations of the coefficients taken from the first step estimations, while the
specification tests are taken from the second step estimations.16 Note that owing to the
correlation with the FTA dummy that arises in the instrumentalisation process the squared
time trend t 2 is dropped from all individual country specifications. As the U-shaped nature
of the adjustment pattern of relative wages has been confirmed by earlier estimations we
focus on the other two crucial variables–the impact of relative FDI and the border effects
on relative wages.
The GMM estimations, which control for simultaneity between the relative regional
wages and FDI, closely resemble the results obtained by RE estimations. As with the RE
estimations, the dynamic estimations find a significant impact of relative regional FDI on
relative regional wages in Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovenia. Similarly, the estimated
coefficients of the border effects on relative regional wages are close to those obtained by
the OLS and RE estimations. The average wage differential between W/N border and non-
border regions over all of the countries is estimated at 2.7% (compared with to 3.1 and
3.3% in the case of OLS and RE estimates respectively). The same is true for individual
country estimations of wage gradients of border regions, which are accordingly lower than
those obtained by the OLS and RE estimations.
These findings are in line with the predictions of the Crozet–Koenig (2004) model
showing that trade liberalisation generally favours the development of the border region
when competitive pressure from international markets is not too high. Crozet and Koenig
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also use data for Romanian NUTS-3 regions for 1990–97 and claim to confirm this thesis.
They, however, test a different model not directly comparable with ours. They show that
urbanisation of the regions is driven by the initial level of urbanisation and initial market
potential, while a high nominal wage level in particular is shown to favour urban growth.
This means that trade liberalisation fosters growth of the existing economic centres in
Romania. This finding is in line with our results as we do not find higher wage levels in the
Romanian W/N border regions, indicating that there was not much relocation of economic
activity towards border regions after trade liberalisation started.
Conclusions
This article analyses the effects of trade liberalisation with the EU on inter-regional
relocation of manufacturing and inter-regional adjustment of relative wages in five CEE
countries. Based on the general principles of new economic geography theory and
acknowledging the specifics of the countries in the sample, we expected that trade
liberalisation might have a dual effect on the distribution of economic activity across the
sampled regions of Central and Eastern Europe. Our assumption of asymmetric location of
domestic regions vis-a`-vis the EU markets, combined with relatively low labour mobility,
would tend to lead to a typical non-monotonic, U-shaped response of relative regional
wages to trade liberalisation. Our second focal point was the impact FDI flows could have
on the direction and speed of the adjustment process. While foreign investment directed at
specific regions could certainly accelerate the adjustment process, its ultimate impact
depends on whether foreign investors target economic centres or W/N border regions in
EU accession countries.
In the second part of the article we turn to examination of the actual pattern of
manufacturing relocation and the adjustment pattern of relative regional wages in five
CEE countries after they liberalised their trade with the EU. Two empirical issues are of
particular interest to us. First, we study whether the response of relative regional wages to
trade liberalisation is non-monotonic. In additions, we test whether the pattern of regional
FDI inflows, falling trade costs after trade liberalisation and the relocation of
manufacturing activity towards western/northern regions can explain the adjustment
pattern of relative regional wages in the five CEE countries. These implications are tested
using a unique regional data panel for Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia
in 1990–2004.
Our estimates show that notwithstanding the econometric method used (OLS, RE and
GMM estimations) the predictions of our model are robustly confirmed. We find very
strong evidence that, in most of the CEE countries analysed, trade liberalisation caused a
decline and divergence of relative regional wages, but the relative wages then adjusted to
the shock mainly by economic geography factors. A U-shaped response of relative
regional wages to trade liberalisation is confirmed for all countries except Romania. On
the other hand, with lower international trade costs, the western/northern border regions
closer to the EU economic centres benefitted most in terms of economic activity by
attracting domestic as well as foreign firms. It is shown that international flows of capital,
as the most mobile factor of production, contributed significantly to the faster adjustment
of economic activity and to faster convergence of relative regional wages after trade
liberalisation in at least three out of the five CEE countries.
To summarise our findings, we can conclude that in CEE countries important inter-
regional relocations of manufacturing activity took place after trade liberalisation with the
EU and that inflows of FDI mostly to the capital and border regions helped foster these
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adjustment processes. However, as economic integration with the EU provides important
opportunities for individual regions, it can also have severe polarisation effects. Based on
our findings, policy makers in the affected CEE countries should be careful to design
appropriate policy measures to either foster the adjustment processes in more fortunate
regions or help overcome the polarisation effects in less fortunate regions. In line with the
suggestions by Traistaru et al. (2003) policy makers should in particular aim at further
economic restructuring within the prospering regions, at attracting foreign direct
investment as well as at enhancing the innovative and technological potential of local
firms by building up the scientific and technological capabilities of local labour and firms.
For regions that have lesser locational advantages income polarisation is likely to be more
severe. To overcome this, policy makers should concentrate on upgrading local
infrastructure, developing schemes for supporting local entrepreneurship as well as human
resources development. As shown by Bellak et al. (2009), while CEE countries mostly
attract FDI by favourable corporate taxes schemes, a favourable infrastructure endowment
may compensate for relatively high taxes. At the same time, as shown by Baldwin et al.
(2003), policy makers should be aware of the fact that most of their policy measures might
have non-linear effects. For example, improvement of infrastructure in a poor domestic
region may have no effect until a certain threshold is reached where convergence occurs
between poor and rich regions. On the other hand, improvements in infrastructure that
facilitate trade between regions may have no effect until a certain threshold is reached
where divergence occurs between the two regions. This calls for very careful and
thoughtfully designed regional economic policies.
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Notes
1. Similar results, with trade liberalisation favouring the development of EU-bordering regions, are
also found by Resmini (2003) and Bru¨lhart et al. (2004).
2. Further support for the proposed divergence – convergence type of adjustment of relative wages
after trade liberalisation is found also at the national level. Polanec (2004) examines the
hypotheses of absolute and conditional convergence for a sample of 25 transition countries over
1990–2002. He finds a negative relationship between productivity growth and the pace of
liberalisation at the initial stage of transition (1990–94), while at the later stages (1999–2002)
evidence is found in favour of convergence of productivity levels among the countries under
examination.
3. A comprehensive overview of alternative NEG models is given in Fujita et al. (1999).
4. See for instance Fidrmuc (2005) and Transition Report (2003) where very low migration
intensity within transition countries is observed.
5. The empirical specification also includes higher order values of time trends to test for the
possible concavities of the temporal response of relative regional wages.
6. Note that relative FDI inflows into the economic centre would further stimulate the initial
divergence (increase the relative wage difference), while inflows targeting primarily the N/W
border regions would stimulate the convergence in wages.
7. Estonia could also be considered an EU-bordering country, but only conditionally as it shared
only a sea border with the EU (Finland and Sweden).
8. PHARE ACE Programme research project ‘European integration, regional specialisation and
location of industrial activity in accession countries’ (Contract No. P98-1117-R) and the RTD
Post-Communist Economies 183
5th FP research project EURECO ‘The impact of European integration and enlargement on
regional structural change and cohesion’ (Contract No. HPSE-CT-2002-00118). Both projects
were financed by the European Commission.
9. Another advantage of this study is that we have access to longer panels of regional data than
previous studies on transition countries. In this way we believe we have the opportunity to study
the complete adjustment pattern of regional economic activity and wages and the underlying
factors affecting these processes.
10. We consider all enterprises where foreign ownership constitutes at least 10% of the ownership
structure as foreign-owned enterprises.
11. Table A2 in the Appendix for more detailed descriptive statistics on the regional pattern of FDI.
12. In the late 1990s some governments (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania) started to actively attract
foreign capital into disadvantaged and poorer regions, which is likely to benefit all regions.
13. In order to assess the robustness of the estimated coefficients on the impact of FDI on wages
(rFDIit) we also ran FE estimates. We find the sign and significance (but not the size) of the
rFDIit coefficients very closely resemble those obtained by the RE estimations.
14. Time trend variables to the third and fourth power have also been included in various
specifications further confirming the empirical relevance of the proposed U-shaped response
curve.
15. Note however that Bru¨lhart and Koenig (2006) estimate wage gradients for a different set of
transition countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) and for a
different period (1996–2000).
16. In Table 5 we omit reporting the coefficients on the lagged relative regional FDI (rFDIit21).
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